COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE POSTMODERN AGE: 
Looking Backward to Look Forward

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ABSTRACT: This article specifies several ways in which the collective behavior portion of Collective Behavior/Social Movement (CBSM) studies may be revitalized in the near future. The revitalization will occur because repertoires of extra-institutional challenge emerging in the postmodern age seem to fall outside the way social movements have been theorized in the last twenty-five years. Today's postmodern trends—increasing consumerism and affluence, individualism, demographic complexity, ideological diversity, global migration, and constant innovation in communications technology—have proliferated new social identities and deconstructed social identities imposed by the Other. As a result, postmodernity's complexities are multiplying the number of small, diverse, and diffuse groupings defining themselves in challenging ways outside the corridors of politics. Indeed these groupings may in the years to come recast what some see as a social movement society into a CBSM Society of diverse challenges to the institutional order.

The new millennium approaches and we find ourselves in a world in which boundaries are rapidly shifting—boundaries of self, nation, society, and even the world itself. The sudden fall of communism, the Los Angeles riots, the Heaven’s Gate mass suicide, the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, and the right-wing movements that are emerging in various parts of the world all seem to mark the end of the old and the coming of the postmodern. All of these episodes occur in the context of a world disordered by globalization and the end of the western imperium (Lemert 1997). Our postmodern world is a world of emergence, contingency, and flux. In American sociology, given that emergence, contingency, and flux define our understanding of collective behavior, it makes sense to assemble a special issue on Collective Behavior and Social Movements in the postmodern age.

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The timing of this issue is all the more compelling because it was twenty-five years ago in October 1973 that the first copies of the Critical Mass Bulletin appeared as part of an initiative to begin a section in the American Sociological Association that would study collective behavior and social movements together. In that same year both Anthony Oberschall’s Social Conflict and Social Movements and John McCarthy and Mayer Zald’s The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization appeared as well. Five years later, a formal petition to the American Sociological Association was circulated to create a separate section for Collective Behavior and Social Movements. Auspiciously, it was also in 1978 that Charles Tilly’s From Mobilization to Revolution was published.

These events—delineating the simultaneous emergence of a joint research section and what came to be the dominant research perspective for social movement analysis—mark the first fissures in the study of collective behavior and social movements together. The 1973 Critical Mass Bulletin proposed that a collective behavior-social movement group (hereafter CBSM) be a subsection of the newly reconstituted social psychology section in the ASA. However, a survey by Enrico Quarantelli and Jack Weller indicated that some people—social movement scholars in particular—did not want to be part of the social psychology section. Thelma McCormack, in the first issue of Critical Mass Bulletin, suggested that a social organizational perspective might be more appropriate than social psychology. Through all of this, John Lofland was the key figure in pushing for a new section, and ultimately establishing it in a way that maintained the traditional link between collective behavior and social movements.1 This had been the tradition in US sociology since the scholarship of Robert Ezra Park and Herbert Blumer earlier in the century (Park and Burgess 1921; Blumer 1939).

Today, when one makes a mental list of the most widely cited and influential research in social movements, one might wonder if the link ever existed, the work of Clark McPhail, Pam Oliver, David Snow, and Gerald Marwell being the most outstanding exceptions.2 As Curtis and Aguirre (1993) point out, there has been an academic imbalance between the increasing emphasis on formal movement structures and decreasing attention to episodic and seemingly chaotic behaviors (e.g. crowds, riots, etc) and between an increasing emphasis on supposedly rational movement elements (e.g., planned protests, professional protest leadership) and a de-emphasis on the so-called emotional components (e.g. crowds, crazes, fads, riots).

For some, but by no means all, the CB in CBSM has been replaced by Collective Action (CA), creating a chasm between two orientations. Today, as the CBSM field becomes truly international, via several important transnational collaborative projects, establishing contacts and exchanging texts through e-mail, and the recent advent of the international journal Mobilization, the CB in CBSM runs the risk of becoming further obscured. This is because for many non-US researchers—especially European scholars—the intellectual tradition linking collective behavior and social movements was never strong in the first place (Diani and Eyerman, 1992; Melucci, 1989).

This focus section of Sociological Perspectives brings together six articles that are unified, not by the CBSM links that existed twenty-five years ago, but rather by
the potential for new insights about how less organized phenomena—including both the well known collective behavior foci on rumors, crowds, riots, panics, etc., and new ones such as are described in Hank Johnston and David Snow’s paper on oppositional subcultures—may play a vital role in distinctly postmodern forms of challenge. In several ways, it may be that, if not a rediscovery, then reconceptualization of the field will provide powerful tools for the study of collective behavior and social movements for the next millennium. In the sections that follow we discuss three areas in which we think this will be true.

END OF THE IMPERIUM: EASTERN EUROPE’S COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

When the Berlin Wall came down, and the iron curtain opened, Eastern European countries where data collection previously had been difficult became sites of investigation. As we come to know more about oppositional behavior in Eastern Europe, we suggest that certain patterned and regularly occurring forms are closer to traditional definitions of collective behavior than to contentious politics in the Western sense. They demonstrate creativity, extra-institutional loci, and less formally structured organization, but still evince flexibility, spatial differentiation, and the communicative basis that represent the hallmark of collective behavior as traditionally defined (Turner and Killian 1957, 1987; McPhail 1991).

For a long time, various area scholars have recognized that collective opposition in East Europe was constrained but not absent. Certainly the 1951 workers’ uprising in Berlin or the 1971 strikes in Gdansk had spontaneous qualities emerging out of workplace organization and sparked by prices increases and policy changes. Nationalist riots in Alma Ata (Kazakh SSR) in 1986, protests in Tbilisi (Georgian SSR) in 1956, and student protests resulting from the cancellation of a concert in Tallinn (Estonian SSR) in 1980—were anomalous in the Marxist-Leninist state. Just as important, they represented spontaneous outbursts developing not from social movement organizations but rather from the organization of everyday life. There also was, of course, debate and disagreement within the party apparatus, which was reformist rather than radical because it did not challenge Marxist-Leninist gospels. Joppke (1995) also indicates that dissident groups were a unique form of opposition that grew from the unique structural context of Leninist regimes. Finally, in the absence of independent civic institutions, researchers plumbed how oppositional activities and values were embedded within and grew out of official institutions. By the late 1980s, social movements in the traditional sense had developed that challenged the state, openly posed alternatives, and put pressure on authorities—all activities that fall within the accepted purview of social movement research. However, as one moves further back in time, to the early 1980s, and further still to the 1960s and 1970s, one can discern collective activities that were social, regularly occurring and yet devoid of anything that might resemble a social movement organization. These activities were mildly oppositional, resistant, and at least partly challenging in so far as they pushed the limits of what was acceptable, or offered alternatives to official ideology.
Under repressive situations, opposition can take forms that are difficult for an outsider to see, let alone measure. Scott (1985, 1990) has described different behaviors that range from atomized individual resistance to more collective assertions, but his analysis did not move beyond diffuse phenomena to embrace collective protest. It makes sense, however, that opposition can be expressed by action occurring at any number of points along a continuum that ranges from individual resistance such as foot-dragging or small acts of sabotage, to sporadic collective gatherings in “hidden arbors,” and occasional protests to full-blown organized revolt against the state by aggrieved communities. The actions that lie towards the less structured end of the continuum, but still remain collective rather than individual or isolated, are embraced by Johnston and Snow’s concepts of subcultures of resistance and subcultures of opposition, as described in the next article. Where to place these phenomena when dealing with political challenge is a question that remains to be resolved. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, in their ambitious attempt to chart our knowledge about political challenges, do not include “... shirking, flight, and what James C. Scott calls everyday forms of resistance” (1996: 31). They express doubt that these forms of opposition and resistance obey the laws of organized contention. However, Johnston and Snow’s article demonstrates that there is another dimension to political challenge beyond the two that are most widely recognized. The first known dimension is size, and ranges from individual to collective behaviors. The second known dimension is structure and ranges from atomized to organized challenges. A third dimension adds depth to these formulae by recognizing two facts: first, at any given time size is a situational variable, depending on who gathers and to whom one is speaking; and second, social organization is not always as it appears on the surface. In Eastern Europe it was common for social groups to manage duplicitous fronts which were officially tolerable, but actually weaved a thread of opposition and resistance throughout their social relations. The duplicitous character of theaters in Czechoslovakia and Poland, cinema production in the Baltic, Transcaucasian, and Asian SSRs, between-the-lines messages of poetry, art, and music as practiced under the communists, have all been widely recognized by scholars as proxies for politics. These are important because they represent ways people construct what Scott calls “voice under domination”—this “voice” was used to criticize the regime for half of the twentieth century. They are a modern permutation of Scott’s everyday resistance—constituting a widely generalizable repertoire of contention that emerged in Leninist states. What they don’t easily do is fit into the equation of challenger and state response that lies at the foundation of social movement analysis in the West.

These forms fit a model closer to collective behavior: diffuse, capable of occasional spontaneity, embedded in the meaning structures of the participants, and discernible not in aggregate measures of events or membership but in interaction. They are diffuse in that their empirical reality—their existence as a social phenomenon—is based on who says what to whom, and when. The sites where these behaviors occur are not exclusively organizational but rather are patterned by speech situations, to use a term taken from linguistically oriented discourse analysis. A speech situation is a typical episode of interaction in which there are tacit
rules of what to say and how to say it. The idea of the “hidden arbors” of oppressed people where complaints and protests are safely voiced captures the way we employ the term here (Scott 1985), with the caveat that they are mostly an urban phenomenon taking place in the coffee shops, kitchens, and after-hour conversations throughout Eastern Europe. Seen through the lens of this concept, the official organizations of neighborhood, folklore societies, student groups, etc. reveal an internal organization that bears subcultural qualities. Johnston and Snow’s typology of subcultures and their analysis of the form they took in Estonia point to an undertheorized genre of collective behavior that takes a diffuse and veiled and often duplicitous form because of the threat of negative state sanction. They are patterned social phenomena predicated upon conscious actions and shared understanding between adherents, often serving as the base for spontaneous outbursts (under repressive conditions) and future mobilization (as repression weakens) but not conducive to sustained political challenge in their present form.

People linked by oppositional speech situations are akin to diffuse social networks that are yet to be articulated into formal social movement organizations. They represent a form of collective behavior, broadly conceived, that is constrained to assume relational forms adapted to survival in the face of pervasive social control. Indeed, the patterned and shared character of their opposition places the existence of these subcultural relations somewhere between the diffuse forms of collective behavior, such as shifts in public opinion, and minimally organized or “twilight” SMOs such as movement halfway houses (Morris 1984) and abeyance structures (Rupp and Taylor 1987). Theoretically, we see this as one their most provocative characteristics.

GLOBALIZATION, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

A second area where we argue a reinvigorated collective behavior focus is appropriate resides in those locales most affected by economic globalization. During the last five years there has been a great deal of interest in the globalization of social movements. However, the tendency has been to move further and further away from collective behavior concepts by analyzing events through the lens of political process theory. Thinking about globalization has centered on two factors: the dependent variable, globalized repertories of contention; and the set of independent variables encapsulated in the concept of political opportunity structure. One of the earliest studies by McAdam and Rucht (1993) explored the transnational diffusion of protest tactics. They argued that the mechanisms of movement similarity were structural and cultural parallels giving rise to common themes such as ecology, nuclear disarmament, women’s issues, the new left, and others. Also, contact between activists is an important mechanism by which movement themes and tactics diffuse internationally. This is exemplified by Nardi’s article in this issue which examines how gay and lesbian movement themes, symbols, and tactics in this issue are diffused internationally. Diffusion occurs because of the increasing inter- and cross-national mobility of men and women who, as tourists,
learned about more "egalitarian relationships" between same-sex partners in openly gay communities in major cosmopolitan centers such as London, Amsterdam, Berlin, New York, and San Francisco. Contact is also facilitated by the globalization of popular media which sensitizes activists to developments in other states. Recent analyses have stressed the role of isomorphic structures of political opportunity that result from the spread of the Western democratic model, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and global market capitalism. Giugni (1998) has argued that movement similarity can be explained in terms of how access to elites and elite coalitions, levels of state control/facilitation, levels of electoral participation, and civic society, when patterned across different nation states, can give rise to similarly shaped movements. The political process approach, with its emphasis on existing SMOs, their resources, political participation and responsiveness, has to date rendered the study of globalization, at least as far as it concerns protest, untouched by collective behavior theory, and for the most part untouchable.

This is a tendency that skews the empirical reality of globalization by ignoring events outside the European orbit. It can be argued that anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia, the layoff of tens of thousands of Brazilian state employees to shield the currency from global speculators, food riots in Malaysia, and rising child prostitution in Thailand are as much results of the globalization process as similarities among German, Italian, Canadian, or Dutch SMOs (Castells, 1997). While globalization has given rise to movement similarities (and their causes are worthwhile to chart), economic globalization means market interdependence, price fluctuations, and IMF-imposed austerity programs. At the local level these events create hardship for the new middle classes, evictions among the rural poor, and disruption of daily subsistence routines for all except the national elite (Walton and Seddon 1994). As terms of trade collapse, we see the popular responses taking the form of each part of Hirschman's well-known (1972) triad: (1) pass, or coping with the economic hardships through innovative approaches to the second economy, as with the Mexican middle class when the bottom fell out of the peso in the 1980s; (2) exit, as the tens of thousands of illegal Indonesian, Thai, and Filipino migrants circulate the South China Sea in search of work; and (3) voice, in the dozens of Indonesian food riots, many of which were directed against Chinese shopkeepers early in 1998. Moreover, there is a relationship between these responses: hundreds of thousands of return migrant laborers will add to Indonesian unemployment, which could reach 10 million by the end of 1998 (of a 90 million workforce). The rate of unemployment in Thailand is expected to be twice the size it was earlier this year, in part due to return migration. The closing of opportunities for exit are likely to lead to further protest.

By definition, globalization means that these phenomena are not limited to South Asia. One is reminded of how austerity campaigns—typically designed to bring currency, foreign exchange reserves, and economic institutions into line with global markets—led to paralyzing national strikes eight years ago in Greece. To add another example, Polish shock therapy on its state-managed economy coincided with rising antisemitism. While Greek strikes grew out of established unions, and waves of antisemitism were more diffuse collective behaviors, it is
important to note that the effects of economic globalization on second-tier, semi-peripheral states are distinct from those in the postindustrial core. They are distinct in ways that compel the scholars of protest and contention in a globalizing world to think in terms of what analytical tools might be appropriate to different state clusters.

In G-7 countries, economic growth in high technology and the tertiary sector, based in part on the export of assembly and manufacturing functions by US firms, creates a diversionary consumer culture. Cheap goods produced in the economies of newly industrializing states flood western markets, keeping prices down and spending up. The movements of the West—women’s rights, homosexual rights, ecology, antinuclear power, to name a select but powerfully assertive few—make demands that are derived not from threatened subsistence but rather rights and identity, not today’s meal but quality of life in the future. It is recognized by world system theorists that core states “purchase” the institutional infrastructure that, on the whole, channels social protest into manageable forms and usually nonviolent tactics, and tends to render the state more responsive to extra-institutional challenges. Building on the same logic, social movements of the postindustrial core nations emerge in the context of structural affinity that homogenize repertoires of contention, issues, and strategies (Giugni 1998). As Charles Tilly has pointed out, the democratic state and institutionalization of channels of government responsiveness to its citizens have given rise to new forms of collective action: demonstrations, petitions, rallies, and interest group formation. These new forms of protest and challenge displaced the older premodern repertoire that often took less direct symbolic forms such as hangings in effigies, mock funerals, charades, songs, and on festive days, gatherings that sometimes became the locus of voicing of collective demands and grievances (1995: 347). In the absence of a responsive state and channels of appeal, this was the best that the urban or rural poor could do.

It is suggestive that the gatherings, protests, food seizures, and communal violence we see today in the newly industrializing states seem to follow Tilly’s repertoires of premodern protest. From our armchairs in the West, they seem to evince a greater degree of spontaneity, although this is an empirical question that one cannot answer from newspaper reports alone. Clearly, they are focused on immediate and pressing grievances, directed at nearby targets that are perceived, rightly or wrongly, as causes of deprivation. These protests often temporarily subside if measures are taken to placate demands by local officials. Tilly notes that food riots, a frequent form of collective behavior in 18th and 19th centuries, rarely became violent. Rather, they took more benign forms such as blocking shipments of grain or seizing stores to sell them at fair prices (1978: 185). It was not uncommon that villagers would attack merchants thought to be profiting unduly from price increases, as we see today in Indonesia. If these observations are correct, and can be generalized to newly industrializing countries, then we can be certain that news reports that reach the West are only the tip of the iceberg and that gatherings and crowds in Malaysian and Indonesian villages are common occurrences in light of rising prices and unemployment. Moreover, the empirical question that remains to be addressed is whether these crowds and
gatherings in a premodern mode are really what they appear to be. Certainly when crowds, whether milling, assertive, or violent, are the dependent variable, the necessity of "bringing the crowd back in," as Pam Oliver argues in her 1989 article, becomes a statement of the obvious when located in many South Asian, Latin American, or African countries.

There simply is too much that is not known about these collective phenomena occurring in response to the local effects of global economic shifts. Like the Eastern Europe collective behavior discussed in the last section, these forms of collective behavior (or collective action) must be understood in a context that is significantly different from the postmodern West. What is needed is a species of methodical internal mapping of development and shifting between subsets of behaviors characteristic of McPhail's (1991) approach to crowd research and Lofland's taxonomies (1985). Moreover, a fundamental shift in recent collective behavior research and theorizing points to the strong similarities between crowd organization and the organization of everyday life. Despite the homogenizing effects of cultural globalization, village life in the Philippines or Thailand is significantly different from everyday life in North America or Western Europe. This suggests that the hypothesized continuity between the crowds and everyday life calls for the analysis of crowd formation with respect to such factors as kinship, honor, vendetta, patronage, communal identity, cultural templates, and the national ideologies of the newly industrializing states.

Given the various dimensions of globalization—economic, cultural, communicative—it makes sense that laminated upon these cultural, spatial, and ideological templates will be a patchwork of global influences, producing an additional set of factors that are an amalgam of the premodern and postmodern. This is the case with the Zapatista uprising, as Schultz describes in his article in this issue. What began as a modern repertoire characteristic of postcolonial societies—a small band of armed revolutionaries—grew rapidly in light of the squeeze macroeconomic policies from Mexico City placed on landowners in Chiapas. In turn, peasants were cast from the land, creating a growing recruitment pool for the Zapatistas (Whitmeyer and Hopcroft 1996). The progress of the insurgency as chronicled by Schultz suggests a sequence of local and global, traditional, modern, and postmodern influences that shaped the unfolding of events. Today, the involvement and participation of international NGOs and "conscience tourism" in the observation of human rights and the establishment of alternative institutions of economic and political participation (and even familial relations) in the Zapatista areas have created a unique form of political contention mixing traditionally dressed indigenous women with children in tow with young Dutch and Swiss feminists.

A similar mix and sequencing is suggested by the growth of the Landless Workers' Movement in Brazil (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra), a rapidly growing movement organization that has organized 279 occupations over the last three years and currently claims 1.38 million acres of land through illegal occupations. This year, austerity campaigns to strengthen Brazil's currency against speculators have led to occupations of large estates by landless peasants and urban poor. Although land occupations are not a premodern protest strategy
per se, they are suggestive of the collective acts of retaliation, resistance, and direct physical control that were characteristic of mid-eighteenth century Great Britain and France (Tilly 1995, 1986). Indeed, there is striking similarity between the industrial revolution and the global revolution as it affects society’s lowest social strata. The poor in Brazil are swept off land and out of factories by global forces beyond their control, just as eighteenth century villagers lost control over land, labor, and goods—control that used to reside in their local communities—to growing capitalism. In Brazil, the movements platform is clear about the effects of global markets, multinational corporations, and Brazilian elites’ intersecting interests in global integration. While the landless workers’ movement is resource-poor, organizers draw upon existing links with the Roman Catholic Church, which in Brazil has a distinctly progressive orientation. Established labor unions have been unable to deal with rising unemployment and the organizational issues of “armies of destitute migrants drifting across the country in search of means to survive.” Indeed, part of the reason for this movement’s rise is that labor unions have been severely debilitated by economic globalization. It is true that organizational elements characteristic of older repertoires (parties, unions, the church) are factors in the movement’s success. However, the mix between the immediate, instrumental and subsistence-based protests characteristic of Europe’s proletarianization two centuries ago, and more current dependency ideology to attribute cause for deprivation points to tactical innovation that, we suggest, characterizes much of this protest in newly industrializing countries. What is needed is close investigation and classification of contentious gatherings in newly industrializing countries today, similar to Charles Tilly’s project for the first industrializing countries of Europe. But this is research that must take place first at the ground level, to gather information on the crowds, gatherings, and riots as they occur.

IDENTITY, COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Both globalization and postmodernism have led to the eruption of new identity claims articulated along the axes of race, gender, sexuality, nationality, class, and religion. According to Castells, one of the most distinctive trends of the 1990s is “the construction of social action and politics around primary identities, either ascribed, rooted in history and geography, or newly built in an anxious search for meaning and spirituality (1996:22). Charles Lemert characterizes this world as one “emerging from a great silence, a silence so cold that the voices we hear today disturb the stupor to which we have grown accustomed” (Lemert 1997:123). Identity and its expression in identity politics is a social fact of our postmodern world in which postmodern fragmentation and globalization are occurring simultaneously (Lemert 1997; Castells 1997; Connolly 1995; Calhoun 1994).

In this final section we shift our focus from those understudied collective forms occurring in the global context to those located primarily in the postmodern West. We argue that a focus on identity and identity construction reveals an area in which the study of collective behavior and social movements can move together into the new millennium taking similar paths rather than divergent ones.
For more than a decade, new social movement theory has built upon collective identity as an organizing theme of numerous contemporary movements (Johnston, Larana, and Gusfield 1994; Cohen 1985; Offe 1985; Melucci 1984, 1985, 1989, 1996). Collective identity, as conceptualized by new social movement theorists, is the definition of group membership shared by adherents based on interaction in submerged networks and emergent through the dialectical and dialogical process of reality construction. In contrast to the perspective of collective action, NSM theorists do not assume that identity always derives from group interests. Indeed it is precisely this point that distinguishes new social movements from others: that because group formation is not interest-driven, group formation based on collective identity becomes something to be explained rather than a constant which enables the analyst to aggregate collective events and focus on structural explanations of their trends.

Where identity construction is not assumed to be interest-driven, the basis of group formation remains an empirical question rooted in the groups and communities where the active creation of identities occurs. Melucci observes that collective identity is not "...a datum or an essence, it is the outcome of exchanges, negotiations, decisions and conflicts among actors" (Melucci 1996:4). The methodological response must take the form of looking at observable practices, such as spoken and written discourse, recurrent and sometimes ritualized acts, symbols, gestures, dress, and demeanor by which members affirm identities, connect experiences, and delineate group boundaries. Hunt and Benford (1994) identify an important data source as those narratives that frame members' experiences in terms of common identities. For all these activities, bounded group interactions are the empirical locus. For instance, Stein's article in this issue uses discourse analysis to study how such different groups as lesbian/gay movements and the Christian Right draw from Holocaust narratives to frame their members' experiences in terms of a common identity—moral actors who are victimized by such state actions as involving persecution or genocide. Another example of empirical research on identity formation using a systematic mix of sources complementing first-hand observation was Thayer's (1997) strategy to trace the construction of divergent identities among lesbian groups in Central America. Similarly, mixing intensive participation in small women's groups with attendance at larger meetings, and analysis of internal documents, newsletters, and press releases was Taylor and VanWilligen's strategy to analyze self-help groups for post-partum depression and breast cancer patients (1996).

Given that the basis of identity formation is a social network, and that much of the real work of identity construction—testing, bridging, elaborating and affirming—takes place in face-to-face gatherings, it is ironic that collective identity has not been widely generalized to the entire field of collective behavior as practiced by most U.S. scholars working exclusively in that tradition. Collective behavior textbooks rarely use identity as an organizing principle (for example see Marx and McAdam 1994; Curtis and Aguirre 1993; Goode 1992). Yet if we move beyond new social movements and look at the traditional armory of collective behavior themes, we find that fashion trends, moral panics, and a diverse array of gathering-
ings are clearly identity-related, and that the concept of collective identity as used by NSM theorists confers a great deal of explanatory purchase.

For example, Davis (1992) and Barnard (1996) both show that fashion communicates and is constitutive of gender, class and sexual identities. Barnard (1996) argues that not only is fashion central to gender, class, and sexual identities, but it can also be revolutionary practice in that it may openly challenge existing class and gender identities. Punk lifestyle relies on fashion and clothing to challenge and critique the aesthetic of the dominant, mainstream, bourgeois culture (Barnard 1996:129-132). Thus, the “...rules and norms of conventional attractiveness were generally broken, flouted, and ignored.” For example, cheap, worthless things like safety pins were plunged through cheeks, ears, and lips, toilet chains adorned chests, tampons and razor blades hung from male and female ears. “Cheap, trashy fabrics (PVC, plastic, lurex, etc.) in vulgar designs (e.g., mock leopard skin) and ‘nasty’ colours, like lime green and pink, became a part of punk clothing” (Barnard 1996:130-131). Although punk as a form of resistance became appropriated by market capitalism such that “domesticated” versions of punk hairdo and body piercing can be found in various “respectable” places in society today, to focus on appropriation and cooption is to miss the point—identity and culture can be the site of dominance and resistance.

This idea is nicely portrayed by the growing of dreadlocks, a hair style taken from the Rastafarian movement. Kegede and Knottnerus’s article in this issue describes how “dreading” is a key boundary marker of Rastafarian identity symbolizing defiance against the establishment. Other markers include a distinctive way of speaking, marijuana use, and “livity” or lifestyle in Rastafarian argot. Dreading is a practice of letting tightly curled hair characteristic of African physiognomy grow out uncombed and unstyled. This allows the tight curls to knit together, producing numerous strands which are often grown shoulder length. Other observers have noted that dreading is used by some African-Americans as an expression of liberationist identity and resistance to European cultural hegemony (Kuumba and Ajanaku 1998). Using interview data, they demonstrate how many African-Americans (and globally, in the Caribbean and South America) define it as an instrument in the cultural “tool kit” of politicized identity. They also note that in the postmodern West, and especially the US where nothing seems exempt from expropriation by marketers, packagers, and advertisers, dreading risks losing its oppositional and resistant meanings because of its popularity.

In these three cases, fashion functions as markers of identity for social actors challenging the dominant codes of society. For some, such as the Rastafarians and punks, fashion and hairstyle are ways to lay claim to free spaces outside the mainstream of society; for others, politicized identity-markers manifest a direct but personal challenge from within. When African American professionals wear dreadlocks—especially those with publicly dramatized roles such as teachers, professors, lawyers, nurses, etc.—the symbolic message is full participation in the dominant society accompanied by steadfastness to their African-American identity. Fashion is transformed into a species of claims-making exercised at the individual level, yet diffusely organized so that it has a fundamental collective
character. This suggests a new repertoire of contention growing out of identity issues characteristic of postmodern society, in which individual rights intersect with communal claims for diversity. The identifying feature of this repertoire is numerous individual acts, whose general and diffuse occurrence is coordinated through loose networks and communication linkages, so that they carry the meaning of a collective, identity-based, challenge.

These are clearly forms of collective behavior rather than collective action. They are both shared and patterned behaviors which are neither formally structured nor driven by collective interests. Indeed, for those within the mainstream of society, the individual calculus of choosing “challenging fashion” carries costs that may be readily quantifiable in economic terms (such as job loss or no promotion), but the benefits lie in the murkier and more difficult-to-quantify realm of identity and solidarity. Reminiscent of everyday resistance in repressive states discussed earlier, these behaviors are not atomized actions, but rather organized by and distributed throughout loose networks of friends and acquaintances, as we may infer from the study of rumors, moral panics, and the diffusion of new ideas (see Victor’s article on moral panics in this issue). Mass media often plays a role in bringing awareness of fashion trends. Paradoxically, the path for these trends is often cut by institutionalized actors, such as the media and even haute couture in Paris, Tokyo, Milan, and elsewhere. Skov (1996) observes how critique and resistance have penetrated the highest levels of fashion. She discusses the radical implications of Rei Kawakubo’s Comme des Garçons collections unveiled at the 1981 Paris fashion shows. The collection’s use of natural materials, dark colors, and the garments’ bagginess and lack of symmetry (mild by today’s standards) was at that time a radical challenge to high fashion, and led observers to comment that the designer was “deconstructing the Western aesthetics of high fashion” (Skov, 1996).6 This was because the collection innovated by reflecting upon the accepted standards of line, style, and color and negated them in its own interpretation of those standards. What this example points to is the way the self-reflectiveness of postmodern society highlights the ambivalent, emergent, and multiple meanings of fashion which become broadly available for assertions of collective identity (Kaiser, Nakagawa, and Hutton 1991).

Alberto Melucci observes that new social movement groups often challenge the “dominant logic” of society by offering up a different lifestyle for their members (1985:812). This association of personal change in lifestyle with politics, especially those in which the “personal is political” lies at the heart of this diffusely structured, identity-as-politics repertoire common in postindustrial societies. The NSMs most typically studied are those that make political challenges via existing channels of influence or through extra-institutional attempts to shape policy decisions. The women’s movement and the ecology movement are characterized by strong formal organizations at the vanguard of pressuring governments. These provide convenient loci for research, but we suggest that they divert attention away from those smaller groups and networks where the majority of the members of the women’s movement, the environmental movement, new religious movements, etc., interact and construct common identities. Building on Oliver’s (1989) observation that movements are constitutive of and are constituted by
crowd gatherings, we see that new social movements constituted by a diversity of
groups. Some of these are formally organized, making direct claims and organiz-
ing protests, but others—many others—provide strong interpersonal ties, articu-
lating new lifestyles and collective identity. In postmodern societies, there are
thousands of small groups with common themes—often strongly anti-establish-
ment in the sense that they challenge society’s dominant logic—but which do not
directly challenge the distribution of power with protest actions. Identity articula-
tion is their repertoire of choice. But even for the major NSMs, formal SMOs draw
upon members from reticulated networks that are embedded in these smaller,
often short-lived groupings.

For every social movement, the mix between formal SMOs and diffuse,
microlevel collective behaviors in small groups is an empirical question. We grant
that for many—those movements most widely studied in the contemporary liter-
ature—attempts to accurately gauge the mix may not be a practical methodologi-
cal strategy because so much of their action is political contention. What takes
place in those small gatherings that comprise the substance of mobilization net-
works can be considered ancillary activities to the larger phenomena of organized
protest and the patterns in which they occur. However, we argue that for others—
and especially for NSMs—the mix may be sufficiently oriented towards identity
construction and maintenance rather than political claims-making. In these cases
the mix between the two should guide methodological decisions and conceptual
development. Left uncharted, it can only disorient theorizing. What kind of
movement are we speaking of when feminism embraces both national lobbying
organizations and breast cancer support groups and postpartum depression sup-
port groups (Taylor and VanWilligen 1996)? How much of the women’s move-
ment is embodied in the bookstores, storefronts, small presses, feminist choruses,
and music festivals that constitute the movement community (Staggenborg
1996)? Or we might turn to even more distant groups (from the perspective of the
contemporary literature) such as The Heaven’s Gate, The Urban Primitives in
North America, (Eder, Staggenborg, and Sudderth 1995) Christian Identity move-
ments in the US (Kaplan, 1997), or globally to The Travellers in England (Hether-
ington 1996) and Japan’s AUM Shinrikyo, to name a few of the hundreds of such
groups that thrive in the advanced industrialized nations. For these, a thorough
critique of society is not accompanied by claims-making. Rather, a great deal of
time, activities, and resources are directed toward creating new collective identi-
ties and maintaining group boundaries (Castells, Yazawa, and Kiselyova 1997). In
some cases, institutional channels to press the collective agenda are simply not
relevant because of the groups’ retreatism. In other cases they are not wanted
where millennial doctrines (Rastafari) or music and fashion (punks) provide a
diversion from concerted challenges despite strong anti-establishment ideology.

Punk subculture is especially instructive in this regard. While not a new social
movement strictly defined, it offers an aggressively anti-establishment lifestyle
and identity to its adherents. Yet punk rage is typically manifested small group
posturing and expressive outbursts at concerts or informal gatherings and rarely
gets translated into coordinated collective action. Punk groups have been widely
studied in Europe (Hebdige 1979; Willis 1978; Laing 1985; Roue 1986) and North
America (Baron 1989; Gold 1987), but no one has asked why punk lifestyle and identity do not give rise to collective protest. It is a subculture of global proportions that is loosely linked by the popularity of music groups, fan magazines, independent music labels for hardcore punk recordings, and distribution networks for their music. In this sense, a potential mobilization structure is in place. Punk ideology, often articulated by their own newsletters and "fanzines," brims with anticapitalist and anarchist ideology, but it has never broadly mobilized a social movement.8

A full answer to this question would require data about member grievances (or lack thereof), network organization, social control, resources, and above all (we hypothesize) the diagnostic, prognostic, and agency elements of shared cognitive frames; but for our purposes we can settle for a somewhat sketchier but nevertheless instructive answer based on two empirical observations. First, internal literature from local punk groups such as Profane Existence Collective in Minneapolis and Strait Edge in Washington D.C. cite "local struggles and actions" as part of their activities.9 Punk groups do mobilize. Second, short-lived protests typically occur when local authorities move to restrict activities or infringe on punk lifestyles or threaten the group’s organization. Police actions such as reclaiming the "free spaces" of Punk subculture such as clubs, and abandoned buildings and prohibiting the clandestine distribution of unlicensed music, give rise to protest. Squatters’ movements in European cities, which are frequently associated with punk groups and youth collectives, are examples in which suddenly imposed grievances that are highly relevant to punk identity can activate preexisting organization, youthful élan, and collective identity into collective action.10 Without challenges to everyday lifestyles by agencies of social control, it seems that the highly expressive punk identity, grounded in the identity repertoire of fashion, music, and patterned interaction with cohorts, is sufficient to provide raison d’être and subcultural cohesion. In this regard, Johnston (1991, 1993) and Snow, Cress, Downey, and Jones (1998) have argued that "quotidian grievances" and disruptions to everyday lifeworlds are particularly potent triggers for collective protest, even when collective inertia seems to be otherwise.

This helps us understand why some identity groups mobilize and others don't, why some challenge political elites and others ignore them. Many NSM groups are organized around identity-based grievances in which the personal is acutely political. The women’s and the homosexual rights movements are the clearest examples, but we might also include Christian fundamentalism, black nationalism, and other ethnic movements as well. In these cases, the close association between identity and grievances means political challenge is a paramount goal and that mobilization via standard repertoires is the common tactic to influence policy elites. However, in other NSMs, the association between identity and grievances is not so apparent. Indeed, for some the grievances that form the basis of a social change program are so distant from everyday life—global warming, saving whales or baby harp seals, or stopping drug testing on chimpanzees—that one can only speculate that identity work done in small groups might be an important component of the group’s existence. It is axiomatic that postmodern society is characterized by unprecedented levels of affluence that have liberated
large segments of the population to pursue activities not related to subsistence (as in "old social movements"), but here we have collective behaviors that are not related to any pressing grievances other than how they are socially constructed. As a group increases the time spent on identity construction and maintenance, it makes sense that their attention to contentious politics decreases—until the group falls off the scale so that it is never noticed by social movement scholars at all, like Punks, Rastafarians, religious cults, millenarian movements, black liberationists, and others.

David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow have recently edited a collection entitled Social Movement Society (1998). The premise of the collection is that social movements are becoming commonplace, so widespread that the state institutionalizes them and coopts their actors. Moreover, the repertoires of extra-institutional challenge are so common that they have been used by established political actors. The lines are blurred between what social movements used to be—namely, extra-institutional challenges to influence political elites—and contemporary society. The preceding discussion, however, suggests that more than a movement society, the postindustrial countries are "collective behavior societies" in which small groups offering alternative and challenging identities are so pervasive that focusing on the institutionalization of protest alone reveals only the tip of the iceberg. It seems to us that in the absence of overarching moral and normative guidelines of smaller communities and social classes, the proliferation of identity groups using identity repertoires to challenge and push the limits of the possible is an underestimated and understudied form of political challenge. Their exact role in social change and the mechanisms by which they work remain open questions, but it is apparent from the hippies in the 1960s that lasting social change need not work wholly through political pressure, policy amendment, and elite adjustment. Indeed, a case could be made that the informal organization of hippie lifestyle and identity had a more lasting effect on American culture via changes in sexual attitudes, fashion, individual freedom, lifestyle tolerance, vague spiritualism, etc., than did the anti-Viet Nam War protests, antinuclear power protests, the antinuclear proliferation movement, and numerous others combined together.

CONCLUSION

This article has specified several ways in which the collective behavior portion of Collective Behavior/Social Movement (CBSM) may be revitalized in the near future. This revitalization may occur because repertoires of extra-institutional challenge emerging in the postmodern and global age seem to fall outside the way social movements have been theorized in the last twenty-five years, particularly from resource mobilization, political process, and collective action perspectives. Certainly, as Meyer and Tarrow (1998) point out, social movements and protest are increasingly institutionalized such that they are a regular part of the political landscape in postindustrial countries, and the majority of these are appropriately studied with only passing concern for the social groups and phenomena we have discussed in this essay. However, our observations are based on a premise that is increasingly being recognized by the community of social move-
ment scholars: namely, that viewing contention through the lens of protest repertoires in North America and Western Europe may distort or even miss the broader panorama of challenge and opposition as it occurs in other parts of the world. We have indicated how this seems to be true in formally repressive regimes of Eastern Europe and the former USSR. We have also indicated how globalizing forces give rise to fundamental subsistence claims that evince a paradoxical mix of premodern protest forms and global influences. The exact nature of these protests and gatherings is an empirical question, but the political, economic, and demographic context of newly industrializing states and peripheral countries is sufficiently different to indicate a return to research within and about the actual protest events so that we get it right at the outset.

Finally, we have indicated that the postmodern West is characterized by a wide diversity of extra-institutional challenges, only a proportion of which are embraced by the most widely studied new social movements. Recognizing the variability in the way that oppositional, anti-establishment, anti-hegemonic, and liberationist identities may be linked with pressing, everyday grievances and translated into concerted, collective action against the state opens a horizon of phenomena that in the past had been defined as anomalies in the study of political challenge. They always existed but never for long occupied those studying the "more compelling" movements, namely, the politically-oriented ones. At best, they reminded one from time to time that something else might be going on outside the accepted channels of influence and challenge. Our suggestion is that postmodern trends—increasing consumerism and affluence, individualism, demographic complexity, ideological diversity, global migration, and constant innovation in communications technology—have proliferated new social identities and deconstructed identities imposed by the other. As a result, postmodernity's complexities are multiplying the number of small, diverse, and diffuse groupings defining themselves in challenging ways outside the corridors of politics. Indeed these groupings may in the years to come recast what some see as a Social Movement Society into a CBSM Society of diverse challenges to the institutional order.

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NOTES

1. We thank Enrico Quarantelli and John Lofland for providing background on the CBSM section.

2. While there are many new textbooks on social movements, the number of CBSM textbooks being produced is remarkably small (Lofland 1997). In fact, we have seen very
few attempts to provide even a survey of the entire collective behavior and social movement domain since Marx and Wood’s seminal essay in 1973.

3. Conceptualizing speech situations as a locus of oppositional activities is more fully developed in Johnston 1996. Speech situations are one of several unique oppositional repertoires characteristic of authoritarian states.

4. As one may draw from Jeff Victor’s analysis of moral panics in this issue, the anti-semitism that arose during these economic dislocations draw from a social discourse in which Jews are historically the target of moral panics.

5. It is to be noted that identity bears on all four of dimensions of collective action which Oberschall and Kim (1996) define as comprising of both collective behavior and social movements: (1) discontent and grievances; (2) beliefs and ideology; (3) the capacity to act collectively, or mobilization; and (4) opportunities for collective action, also called political opportunity structures.

6. A propos of economic globalization, Kawakubo’s success as well as that of Issey Miyake and Yohji Yamamoto signals the geographic shift from Paris as the center of global fashion to a multipolar world that includes Tokyo (Skov, 1996). Not only that, it deconstructed what was signified as being “Japanese.”

7. These are widely recognized activities of the women’s movement which are often brought into the analysis by the recent interest in culture and free spaces (Taylor and Whittier 1995). The recent success and extensive media coverage of the Lilith Fair raised questions about its ambiguous meaning and location in the women’s movements. Specifying the link between the cultural focus and the collective behavior tradition is yet another consideration but one which lies beyond the scope of this report.

8. Fuchs (1998) argues that punk groups such as sexpod, Tribe 8, Pansy Division and various queercore and Riot Grrl acts and their audiences, through a series of “mutually appreciative acts,” constituted a loose community and a shared identity—everyone was “queer.” These acts through play and irony challenge and deconstruct class, gender, and sexual boundaries.

9. Snow, Johnston, and McCallum (1995) have utilized a frame analysis to examine why the antiestablishment themes of the punk subculture rarely lead to mobilization. Garth McCallum, a Ph.D. student at the University of Arizona is looking at the organization of the punk subculture from a social movement perspective. His observations, in part, inform our discussion here.

10. Examples of such youth groups include those described in Alberto Melucci’s seminal collection of NSM groups in Milan (see Lodi and Grazioli 1984). It is not surprising to note that some of these youth subcultures such as punk and raves are at the center of moral panics in Europe and the United States.

REFERENCES


